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Analogy and authority in cyberterrorism discourse: 
An analysis of global news media coverage 
 
LEE JARVIS, STUART MACDONALD and ANDREW WHITING 
 
This article explores constructions of cyberterrorism within the global news media between 2008 and 2013. It 
begins by arguing that the preoccupation with questions of definition, threat and response in academic 
literature on cyberterrorism is problematic, for two reasons. First, because it neglects the constitutivity of 
representations of cyberterrorism in the news media and beyond; and, second, because it prioritises policy-
relevant research. To address this, the article provides a discursive analysis drawing on original empirical 
research into 31 news media outlets across the world. Although there is genuine heterogeneity in 
representations of cyberterrorism therein, we argue that constructions of this threat rely heavily on two 
strategies. First, appeals to authoritative or expert ‘witnesses’ and their institutional or epistemic credibility. 
And, second, generic or historical analogies, which help shape understanding of the likelihood and 
consequences of cyberterrorist attack. These strategies have particularly discursive importance, we argue, 
given the lack of readily available empirical examples of the ‘reality’ of cyberterrorism. 
 
Key words: cyberterrorism; discourse; news; media; terrorism. 
 
Introduction  
The potential ramifications of a serious cyberterrorist attack enjoy periodic emergence within 
the global news media. A 2013 article in The Washington Post, for example, asked ‘Is the 
2 
U.S. Prepared for Cyberterrorism?’;1 returning to themes raised by Fox News two years prior: 
‘10 Years After 9/11, Are America's Cyberdefenses Weaker?’2 The UK’s Daily Mail reported 
related concerns because of an over-dependence on cyber-technology within the British 
national security architecture: ‘Cyber terrorists could inflict ‘fatal’ attack on Britain because 
Armed Forces rely so heavily on computers, MPs warn’.3 Meanwhile, also in 2010, The 
Australian similarly cautioned: ‘Cyber terrorism threat ‘not taken seriously enough’’.4 
 Headlines such as these indicate a widespread concern with the threat posed by 
cyberterrorism to various referents. Indeed, as several authors have argued, the news media 
has been one of the most prominent sites in which this threat has been securitized. Gabriel 
Weimann, for instance, suggests that, ‘much of the discussion of cyberterrorism has been 
conducted in the popular media, where journalists typically strive for drama and sensation 
                                                          
1
 Carter Eskew, “Is the U.S. prepared for cyberterrorism?,” The Washington Post, March 29 2013, accessed 
December 15 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2013/03/29/is-the-u-s-prepared-
for-cyberterrorism/.  
2
 John R. Quain, “10 Years After 9/11, Are America's Cyberdefenses Weaker?,” Fox News, September 10 2011, 
accessed December 15 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/09/10/10-years-after-11-are-americas-
cyberdefenses-weaker/.  
3
 Ian Drury, “Cyber terrorists could inflict 'fatal' attack on Britain because Armed Forces rely so heavily on 
computers, MPs warn,” Mail Online, January 9 2013, accessed December 15 2014, 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2259374/Military-cyber-attack-threat-Armed-Forces-rely-heavily-
computers-MPs-warn.html.  
4
 Fran Foo, “Cyber terrorism threat ‘not taken seriously enough’,” The Australian, September 14 2010, accessed 
December 15 2014, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/cyber-terrorism-threat-not-taken-seriously-
enough/story-e6frgakx-1225921434904?nk=8348714490b52fe465d858bc0dc812e2.  
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rather than for good operational definitions of new terms’.5 Maura Conway, more recently, 
notes that with ‘the aid of the mass media, cyberterrorism came to be viewed as the “new” 
security threat par excellence’.6 In some ways, there is little unusual here. Print, broadcast 
and other forms of journalism are frequently accused of exaggerating risks. What makes 
efforts at securitizing cyberterrorism particularly interesting, however, is that they operate in 
the absence of two conditions that might increase their plausibility. First, some measure of 
intellectual consensus that cyberterrorism does indeed pose a significant security threat. And, 
second, some form of substantiating empirical evidence. In other words, if media discourse 
does indeed demonstrate a widespread concern with this threat, that concern must be 
articulated and repeated without the use of possible (and especially dramatic) examples of 
this phenomenon, on the one hand. And, on the other hand, without invocation of a broader 
‘common sense’ amongst relevant academic ‘experts’. This may help explain why, as 
Michael Stohl notes: ‘the media, when they report the possibilities raised by various 
governmental officials, bureaucrats as well as elected officials, don’t necessarily discriminate 
between those threats which are possible and/or probable and those which are not’.7 
 This article contributes to these explorations by offering the first systematic study of 
media representations of cyberterrorism of its size. Specifically, it reports on original 
research into competing constructions of cyberterrorism published by 31 different news 
                                                          
5
 Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?”, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 
Vol. 119 (2004), n.p.; See also, Gabriel Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: The Sum of All Fears?”, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 28, No. 2 (2005), pp. 129–149. 
6
 Maura Conway, “The Media and Cyberterrorism: A Study in the Construction of ‘Reality’”, (2008). Available: 
http://doras.dcu.ie/2142/1/2008–5.pdf (accessed 16 May 2013), pp. 43–44. 
7
 Michael Stohl, “Cyber terrorism: a clear and present danger, the sum of all fears, breaking point or patriot 
games?”, Crime, law and social change, Vol. 46, No. 4-5 (2006), pp. 223-238, 228. 
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media outlets across the world between 1 January 2008 and 8 June 2013.  The article’s first 
contribution is therefore, simply, to add empirical depth to the conceptual accounts 
considered above. This is important because, as demonstrated below, there exists some 
heterogeneity within media constructions of the figure of the ‘cyberterrorist’ and the threat 
that s/he poses. At the same time, we are also able to demonstrate that a dominant focus on (i) 
the activities of offline terrorist groups within media discourse, as well as (ii) a privileging of 
apprehensive threat assessments around cyberterrorism adds credibility to the above fears 
around hyperbole and exaggeration. The article’s second – analytical – contribution is to 
highlight the importance of two features which are integral to this discourse yet relatively 
under-explored. These are, first, the importance of analogy and other forms of comparison 
with offline or historical events in the construction of threat scenarios. And, second, the role 
of specific authoritative voices – frequently from the cybersecurity industry – within media 
coverage, which are widely employed to make sense of the likely consequences of a 
cyberterrorist attack. These features, we argue, together compensate for the lack of 
substantiating empirical evidence within news media discourse on cyberterrorism noted 
above. 
 The article begins with a brief review of the relevant academic literature on 
cyberterrorism. Here, we argue that, with few exceptions, this literature is overwhelmingly 
oriented toward three research questions: (i) what is cyberterrorism?, (ii) what threat does 
cyberterrorism pose, and to whom?, and (iii) how should this threat be countered? This 
orientation is problematic, we suggest, for two reasons. First, because it neglects the 
constitutivity of linguistic and other representations of cyberterrorism. And, second, because 
it prioritises problem-solving, policy-relevant research over critical enquiry. A second section 
situates this article within constructivist approaches to security discourse, upon which we 
5 
introduce our research methodology and analysis. The article concludes by reflecting on the 
significance of our findings, before pointing to scope for future research. 
 
Defining, assessing and countering cyberterrorism 
Although cyberterrorism presents a comparatively recent addition to our security 
imaginaries,
8
 a burgeoning academic literature has now begun to emerge around this 
phenomenon. To date, three sets of questions have dominated this work. These concern: (i) 
the meaning of this term; (ii) the significance of the threat posed by cyberterrorism; and, (iii) 
appropriate forms of response to this threat. 
 To begin with definitional issues, four features of the term cyberterrorism generate 
particular disagreement. The first is the type of conduct required for an act to be considered 
thus.
9
 Broad conceptions encompass the full range of terrorists’ online activities, from 
radicalisation, communication and attack planning through to fundraising, training and 
propaganda. For some, such an understanding has value for unpacking the plurality of ways 
in which the Internet has penetrated all aspects of ‘the terrorism matrix’.10 The contrasting – 
and dominant – view, however, is that the term should not incorporate preparatory and 
support activities for offline attacks, and that more is to be gained by restricting its use to 
actual attacks or threats thereof via digital technologies.
11
 This leads to a second contested 
                                                          
8
 The origins of the term cyberterrorism are typically located in the mid-1980s, see for example: Barry Collin, 
“The future of cyberterrorism”, Criminal Justice International, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1997), pp. 15–18. 
9
 Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald, “What is Cyberterrorism? Findings from a Survey of Researchers”, 
Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 37, No. 1 (2014), pp. 68-90. 
10
 Sarah Gordon and Richard Ford, “Cyberterrorism?”, Computers & Security, Vol. 21, No. 7 (2002), pp. 636-
647, 638. 
11
 For example, see: Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: The Sum of all Fears?”, op. cit., pp. 129-149. 
6 
feature: the harm requirement. Whilst some definitions – such as Collin’s depiction of 
cyberterrorism as ‘hacking with a body count’12 – insist that a cyberterrorist attack must 
engender physical violence against people, alternative approaches accept the possibility of 
other types of target and damage, such as significant economic
13
 or environmental damage
14
 
or even online effects alone.
15
 A third contestation concerns intentionality. A common feature 
of many existing definitions of cyberterrorism is a political or ideological motive and the 
creation of fear.
16
 Others, however, such as Holt argue that relaxing any ‘generation of fear’ 
requirement is beneficial for defining cyberterrorism since it recognizes the fact that, 
‘extremist groups utilize the Internet in ways that more closely resemble the characteristics of 
                                                          
12
 Quoted in James D. Ballard, Joseph G. Hornik and Douglas McKenzie, “Technological Facilitation of 
Terrorism: Definitional, Legal and Policy Issues”, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 45, No. 6 (2002), pp. 
989-1016, 992. 
13
 Jian Hua and Sanjay Bapna, “How Can We Deter Cyber Terrorism?”, Information Security Journal, Vol. 21, 
No. 2 (2012), pp. 102-114. 
14
 Keiran Hardy and George Williams, ‘What is Cyberterrorism? Computer and Internet Technology in Legal 
Definitions of Terrorism’ in in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and S. Macdonald (eds.), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, 
Assessment and Response (New York: Springer, 2014), pp. 1-24. 
15
 Cronin, A. K. “Behind the curve: Globalisation and international terrorism”, International Security, Vol. 27, 
No. 3 (2002-2003), pp. 46-47. 
16
 See: Dorothy Denning. “Cyberterrorism: Testimony Before the Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism 
Committee on Armed Service U.S. House of Representatives”, (May 2000), available: <http://www.stealth 
iss.com/documents/pdf/CYBERTERRORISM.pdf> (accessed 28 June 2015); Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby 
and Eric D. Shaw, “From car bombs to logic bombs: The growing threat from information terrorism”, Terrorism 
and Political Violence, Vol. 12 No. 2 (2000), p. 101; Ronald Heickerö, “Cyberterrorism: Electronic Jihad”, 
Strategic Analysis, Vol. 38, No. 4, (2014), p. 556. 
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cybercrimes including the dissemination of information to incite violence and harm’.17 The 
final contested definitional issue concerns agency. Some stipulate that only non-state actors 
can perpetrate such acts.
18
 On this view, attacks by states are better captured via an 
alternative label, such as cyberwarfare or cyberespionage. However, the predominant view 
amongst researchers is that states are also capable of engaging in cyberterrorism, with some 
authors arguing that they already do so.
19
  
 A second prominent debate concerns the magnitude of the cyberterrorism threat. 
Prominent within the ‘concerned’ literature here are hypothetical examples of the damage 
cyberterrorists could inflict. In an influential piece published in 1997, for instance, Collin 
offers several such scenarios including the disruption of air traffic control systems to cause a 
collision between two large civilian aircraft.
20
 Warnings of particular vulnerabilities within 
cyberspace are prominent too, with many arguing these will increase as further aspects of life 
migrate online.
21
 Wilson, for example, expresses particular concern about zero-day exploits – 
codes which take advantage of previously unknown vulnerabilities in computer systems – 
                                                          
17
 Thomas J. Holt, “Exploring the Intersections of Technology, Crime, and Terror”, Terrorism & Political 
Violence, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2012), pp. 337-354, 341. 
18
 Mark M. Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy”, Computer Fraud & Security, Vol. 2 (1998), pp. 8-10. 
19
 Heickerö, op. cit., p. 556; Lee Jarvis, Stuart Macdonald and Lella Nouri, “State Cyberterrorism: A 
Contradiction in Terms?”, Journal of Terrorism Research, Vol. 6, No. 3 (2015), pp. 62-75. 
20
 Collin, op. cit., pp. 15–18. 
21
 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”, Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (January 2014), available: 
<http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/DNIthreats2014.pdf> (accessed 28 June 2015). 
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since no technical defence exists until after their discovery.
22
 Weimann, moreover, suggests 
that cyberattacks may prove attractive to terrorist groups given the wider selection of 
available targets, the ability to conduct attacks remotely, and the Internet’s potential for 
anonymity.
23
 More sceptical views argue cyberterrorism remains unlikely because of a range 
of factors including: the higher cost of cyberattacks, relative to conventional physical attacks; 
the complexity of such attacks, and the risks involved in outsourcing to professionals to 
mitigate this; the proven destructive potential of traditional methods; and, the limited media 
impact of cyberattacks.
24
 More formal cost-benefit analyses similarly conclude that the cost 
of perpetrating cyberattacks relative to physical attacks such as 9/11 suggests the former are 
likely to remain an unattractive option for terrorist groups.
25
 
 The final debate focuses on responses to cyberterrorism. Target-hardening, including 
the enhanced use of firewalls to act as a form of ‘perimeter defence’26 is one frequently 
discussed aspect of this debate. Devising appropriate legislation to combat cyberterrorism is 
                                                          
22
 Clay Wilson, “Cyber Threats to Critical Information Infrastructure” in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and S. Macdonald 
(eds.), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response (New York: Springer, 2014), pp. 123-136. 
23
 Weimann, “Cyberterrorism: How Real is the Threat?”, op. cit. 
24
 Maura Conway, “Reality Check: Assessing the (Un)Likelihood of Cyberterrorism” in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and 
S. Macdonald (eds.), Cyberterrorism: Understanding, Assessment and Response (New York: Springer, 2014), 
pp. 103-121. 
25
 Giampiero Giacomello, “Bangs for the Buck: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Cyberterrorism”, Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2004), pp. 387-408; Tom Chen and Turki Al-Garni, “A Cost-Damage View of 
Cyberterrorism” in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and S. Macdonald (eds.), Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 72-85. 
26
 William A. Wulf. and Anita K. Jones, “Reflections on cybersecurity”, Science, Vol. 326, No. 5955 (2009), p. 
943. 
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another prominent topic of discussion;
27
 however the effectiveness of enacting such laws at 
the domestic level has been questioned.
28
 This is, in part, because of the significant problems 
of attribution in the cyber realm, and the scope for a knowledgeable attacker to avoid 
detection.
29
 Difficulties of attribution also pose challenges for states wishing to respond to 
cyberattacks under international law given the ability of malicious actors to commit acts 
without being ‘entirely within the territory of a single sovereign’30 by routing attacks through 
intermediate systems prior to hitting their target
31
 The need for international and 
public/private coordination therefore attracts much attention in these literatures,
 32
 although 
cooperation at each level remains beset by considerable problems. 
                                                          
27
 Neal K. Katyal, “Criminal law in cyberspace”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 149, No. 4 
(2001), pp. 1003-1114; Richard W. Downing, “Shoring up the weakest link: What lawmakers around the world 
need to consider in developing comprehensive laws to combat cybercrime”, Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2005), pp. 705-762. 
28
 Patrick Bishop, “Cyberterrorism, Criminal Law and Punishment-based Deterrence” in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and 
S. Macdonald (eds.), Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 107-
124. 
29
 Hua and Bapna, op. cit., pp. 102-114. 
30
 Susan W. Brenner, “Cybercrime jurisdiction”, Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol. 46, No. 4-5 (2006), p. 
190. 
31
 Susan W. Brenner, ““At Light Speed”: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare”, Journal 
of Criminal Law & Criminology, Vol. 97, No. 2 (2007), pp. 379-475. 
32
 See, for example: Johannes M. Bauer and Michel J. G. van Eethen “Cybersecurity: Stakeholder incentives, 
externalisites and policy options”, Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 33, No. 10-11 (2009), pp. 706-719; Steve 
Purser, “The European cooperative approach to securing critical information infrastructure”, Journal of Business 
Continuity & Emergency Planning, Vol. 5, No. 3 (2011), p. 237; Stepanie T. Solansky. and Tammy E. Beck, 
“Enhancing community safety and security through understanding interagency collaboration in cyber-terrorism 
 
10 
 
Cyberterrorism discourse 
Despite the diversity of perspectives within the above debates, existing literature is 
overwhelmingly oriented toward a conception of cyberterrorism as an extra-discursive 
phenomenon. Whether cyberterrorism is approached narrowly or broadly, whether it is 
perceived as a significant or exaggerated threat, whether or not it is even deemed to have 
occurred, the actual or potential existence of something that may appropriately be described 
as ‘cyberterrorism’ is (at least) implicit in much of this work. Indeed, this general ontological 
consensus is precisely why the above questions are so intensely debated. Criticisms of overly 
expansive uses of the term are only possible because they are grounded in alternative 
(narrower) understandings. Sceptical retorts to hyperbolic threat scenarios, similarly, argue 
for a reinterpretation of risk by reworking assessments of vulnerability and the likely cost-
benefit calculations would-be cyberterrorists might make.
33
 A correspondential approach to 
cyberterrorism knowledge, then, underpins these discussions in which claims are assessed or 
critiqued for the accuracy with which they represent reality. 
 This approach to cyberterrorism as something capable of capture in our labels and risk 
assessments is problematic, we argue, because it neglects the constitutivity of competing 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
exercises”, Administration & Society, Vol. 40, No. 8 (2009), pp. 852-872; Pardis M. Tehrani and Nazura A. 
Manap and Hossein Taji, “Cyber terrorism challenges: The need for a global response to a multi-jurisdictional 
crime”, Computer Law & Security Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (2013), pp. 207-215. 
33
 Although this is overwhelmingly the case in the literature on the cyberterrorism threat, alternative - 
constructivist and deconstructivist - approaches toward desecuritization are, of course also feasible. On this, see: 
Paul Roe, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 
3 (2004), pp. 279-294. 
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knowledge claims thereof.
34
 Definitions and understandings of cyberterrorism - in law, 
scholarship, media discourse and elsewhere - create that which they only purport to describe. 
Cyberterrorism is produced as an identity - as well as a threat - through these very attempts to 
establish its meaning and significance. Such attempts, moreover, are themselves embedded in 
etymological and other genealogies, saturated with intertextual relations, reliant upon the 
positing of sameness and difference between cyberterrorism and other phenomena, and 
located in (open, yet contested) contexts of cultures, norms, institutions and power relations. 
Security issues, such as cyberterrorism, are ‘made’ through social and discursive practice, not 
‘given’.35 As such, efforts to define and model it serve to reify cyberterrorism by overlooking 
the contingent and constructed character of this ‘threat’. 36  And, this is the case of 
numerically-inclined as well as linguistic contributions to this literature, for, ‘even when data 
speak, the language with which they do so is only ever ours, including the categories and 
algorithms that do the mining and thus constitute the data in the first place’.37 
                                                          
34
 See: Charlotte Epstein, “Constructivism or the eternal return of universals in International Relations. Why 
returning to language is vital to prolonging the owl’s flight”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 
19, No. 3 (2013), pp. 399-519. 
35
 For a recent overview on debates over how this process takes place within securitization theory, see Mark B. 
Salter and Can E. Mutlu, “Securitisation and Diego Garcia”, Review of International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 4 
(2013), pp. 815-834. 
36
 Eva Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN Debates on a Definition of 
International Terrorism”, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 25, No. 2 (2013), pp. 183-201, 184. 
37
 Epstein, op. cit., p. 500. 
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 A related, but potentially separable limitation of much existing literature is its 
problem-solving emphasis.
38
 The importance of the question of response considered above, 
and its connection to ostensibly preliminary work of definition and threat assessment, 
indicates the value attached to policy relevance within this research. The risk here, of course, 
is that this reproduces an unnecessarily circumscribed conception of what scholarship should 
look like that has been widely critiqued within the broader fields of terrorism research and 
International Relations; a conception that prioritises knowledge’s instrumental rather than 
critical value.
39
 Although Cox
40
 - and others
41
 - attribute merit to problem-solving research in 
certain contexts, two limitations might be identified. The first is that it risks overlooking the 
partiality - incompleteness and situatedness - of any knowledge of (here) cyberterrorism. As 
Breen-Smyth suggests, paraphrasing Cox, ‘research, like theory, is from somewhere and for 
someone…and therefore…claims to objectivity and value-freedom are highly problematic’.42 
                                                          
38
 Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-155. 
39
 See, amongst others, Jeroen Gunning, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?”, Government and Opposition, 
Vol. 42, No. 3 (2007), pp. 363-393; Richard Jackson et al, Terrorism: A Critical Introduction (Basingtoke: 
Palgrave, 2011); Lee Jarvis, “The spaces and Faces of Critical Terrorism Studies”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 40, 
No. 1 (2009), pp. 5-27. 
40
 Cox, op. cit. 
41
 For example, Harmonie Toros, “‘We Don’t Negotiate with Terrorists!’ Legitimacy and Complexity in 
Terrorist Conflicts”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 39, No. 4 (2008), pp. 407-426. 
42
 Marie Breen Smyth, “Subjectivities, ‘suspect communities’, governments, and the ethics of research on 
‘terrorism’”, in R. Jackson, M. B. Smyth and J. Gunning (eds.), Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research 
Agenda (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 194-215. 
13 
The second is that paradigmatic norms such as these too readily facilitate the dismissal of non 
policy-relevant work via charges including pedantry, obscuritanism and irrelevance.
43
 
 These problems of reification and research orientation have been addressed in relation 
to terrorism more generally via the emergence of a growing body of ‘critical’ work sketching 
the production of terrorism in discourse, practice and technologies.
44
 Whilst some of this self-
designates as ‘critical terrorism studies’; 45  much speaks to related audiences within 
International Relations.
46
 On cyberterrorism specifically, a small number of studies now also 
exist in which a similar meta-theoretical scepticism might be identified. Dunn Cavelty,
47
 for 
instance, employs framing theory to explore the securitization of cyberterrorism within US 
political discourse. Her ‘mini-case study’,48 focused on ‘official policy papers, hearings, and 
                                                          
43
 See, for example, David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, “We’re all Terrorists Now: Critical - or Hypocritical 
- Studies “on” Terrorism”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2009), pp. 292-302. 
44
 See, amongst many others, Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede, eds., Risk and the War on Terror 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2008); Ty Solomon, “Social Logics and Normalisation in the War on Terror”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (2009), pp. 269-294; Charlotte Heath-Kelly, 
“Counter-Terrorism and the Counter-Factual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ Discourse and the UK Prevent 
Strategy”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2013), pp. 394-415. 
45
 For example, Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counterterrorism 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005); Lee Jarvis, Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the 
War on Terror (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2011). 
46
 Stuart Croft, Culture, Crisis and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); 
Jack Holland, Selling the War on Terror: Foreign Policy Discourses after 9/11 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012). 
47
 Myriam Dunn Cavelty, “Cyber-Terror—Looming Threat or Phantom Menace? The Framing of the US Cyber-
Threat Debate”, Journal of Information Technology & Politics, Vol. 4, No. 1 (2008), pp. 19-36. 
48
 Ibid., p. 23. 
14 
other statements of key actors’;49 a decision justified for her because, ‘Top-level documents 
reflect actual presidential intentions, as opposed to public statements of purpose, which 
frequently leave out sensitive details and, on occasion, directly conflict with the stated goals 
of the administration’.50 Maura Conway,51 similarly, sets out to ‘excavate’52 the development 
of ‘cyberterrorism’ through an exploration of popular, media and scholarly engagements 
therewith, while Bowman-Grieve engages with social psychology literature to read news 
media representations of ‘cyberterrorism’ through the category of ‘moral panics’. 53  Her 
analysis highlights the importance of different authoritative voices within this process, to 
which we turn in our discussion below, and draws on a selection of 100 Anglo-American 
media sources published between 1996 and 2013. It is also possible, finally, to identify 
constructivist explorations of cyber-security discourse more broadly, wherein cyberterrorism 
is treated as one of several (discursively) connected threats. Barnand-Wills and Ashenden, for 
instance, draw on Foucauldian governmentality, ‘to identify a relatively consistent discourse 
of cyber security that involves trends of uncertainty, risk perception, securitization, and 
potential militarization’54  within ‘current cyber security policy developments in both the 
                                                          
49
 Ibid., p. 23. 
50
 Ibid., p. 23. 
51
 Maura Conway, “Cyberterrorism: Media Myth or Clear and Present Danger?”, in J. Irwin (ed.) War and 
Virtual War: The Challenges to Communities (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B.V., 2004), pp. 79-98. 
52
 Ibid., p. 81. 
53
 Lorraine Bowman-Grieve, “Cyber-terrorism and Moral Panics: A reflection on the discourse of 
cyberterrorism”, in T. Chen, L. Jarvis and S. Macdonald (eds.), Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 86-106. 
54
 David Barnard-Wills and Debi Ashenden, “Securing Virtual Space: Cyber War, Cyber Terror, and Risk”, 
Space and Culture, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2012), pp. 110-123, 110. 
15 
United Kingdom and United States’. 55  Hansen and Nissenbaum, similarly, apply 
securitization theory to the 2007 cyber war against Estonia to identify, ‘three ‘‘security 
grammars’’ distinct to the cyber security sector: hypersecuritizations, everyday security 
practices, and techniﬁcations’.56 
 This article seeks to advance this nascent body of research via a discourse analysis of 
media representations of cyberterrorism.
57
 In contrast to the literature discussed in the above 
section, it focuses not on what cyberterrorism is, nor on how ‘we’ should confront this threat. 
Rather, it asks how cyberterrorism is produced as an identity and a threat within the 
mainstream news media. This approach is applied to findings from a research project into 
news items published within thirty-one different international media outlets between 1 
January 2008 and 8 June 2013.
58
 The project’s corpus was generated using a key word search 
for the terms <cyber terrorism>, <cyberterrorism> and <cyber terror> on the internal search 
                                                          
55
 Ibid., p. 111. 
56
 Lene Hansen and Helen Nissenbaum, “Digital disaster, cyber security, and the Copenhagen School”, 
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 4 (2009), pp. 1155-1175, 1171. 
57
 For more expansive overviews of the commitments of discourse theory than possible here, see Jacob Torfing, 
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 To facilitate comparative analysis of the importance of media type, our research included broadsheet 
newspapers, tabloid newspapers and the websites of media production companies. The thirty-one sources 
selected were: ABC News, al Aljazeera, The Australian, Australian Financial Review, The Australian 
Telegraph, BBC, Boston Globe, Channel 4 News, China Daily, CNN, Daily Mail, Financial Times, Fox News, 
The Guardian, The Herald Sun, The Independent, LA Times, The New York Times, Reuters, Russia Today, Sky 
News, South China Morning Post, The Straits Times, The Sun, The Sydney Morning Herald, The Telegraph, 
The Times of India, USA Today, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, The West Australian. 
16 
engines of our identified publications. This generated a total of 535 relevant items, including 
news stories on current affairs, technology stories, opinion pieces, editorial reflections, 
cultural analysis - including reviews of fictional representations of cyberterrorism
59
 - and 
special reports. 
2008 and 2013 were set as the project’s parameters for two reasons. First, because this 
provided sufficient data through which to explore developments in reportage on 
cyberterrorism: 1986 days of media content in total. And, second, because this period 
incorporated relevant events which had attracted considerable media coverage, including 
cyber-attacks on Georgia (2008), revelations of the Stuxnet attack (2010), publication of the 
UK’s National Security Strategy (2010), and release of the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy: 
Protecting and Promoting the UK in a Digital World (2011). The thirty-one news outlets 
were chosen for: reasons of accessibility, which included the availability of a searchable 
online archive and English medium content;
60
 diversity of political perspective, given the 
prominence of concerns around privacy and liberty within cyberterrorism discourse; to 
incorporate a range of corporation types; size of readership, where possible favouring 
publications with the highest circulation figures; and, diversity of geographical origin, 
seeking to complement the study’s primary focus on news outlets in the UK, US and 
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Australia with others from China, India, Singapore and beyond in order to facilitate 
international comparison.
61
  
Following collection of our data, each news item was subject to a discourse analysis 
involving two stages. The first stage identified a range of relevant descriptive information 
under the following headings: Publication title; Online only publication?; Date of publication; 
URL; Country of publication; Article headline; Article length; and, Is there accompanying 
imagery, if so of what? The second stage involved an immersive reading of each article 
‘through’ the following themes: What type of piece is the news item (for example is it a 
current affairs discussion or a technology blog)?; What is the geographical focus of the item?; 
What, if any, background knowledge is assumed?; Is a specific cyber event mentioned, and if 
so what?; Is a specific non-cyber event mentioned, and if so what?; Is cyberterrorism the 
primary or secondary focus, or only mentioned in passing?; How is cyberterrorism depicted 
(for example, is a narrow or broad understanding evident)?; To what is cyberterrorism 
compared or contrasted?; Are sources cited, and if so whom or what?; What referent objects 
are posited? How concerned is the item about the cyberterrorism threat?; How are 
cyberterrorists represented? What subject position is the reader invited to inhabit?; Any other 
information of interest or relevance? These categories were generated from our research 
questions as well as iteratively via analysis of the relevant academic literature and 
preliminary reading of our data.  
Although this article deals with research material generated across the above ‘themes’ 
its primary focus is upon questions relating to: representations of cyberterrorism; 
comparisons between cyberterrorism and other threats; and, citation or invocation of 
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sources.
62
 Moreover, although many of our sources also maintain social media accounts,
63
 
these accounts tend to focus on directing potential readers to news items. Our commitment to 
an immersive discourse analysis of news media coverage meant that we therefore focused our 
research on the news items themselves, rather than any social media output of these 
organisations. 
 
Cyberterrorism and the news media 
It is important to begin our analysis by noting that there is no uniform, uncontested discourse 
on cyberterrorism within the international news media. Distinct and frequently contrary 
voices may be identified therein, and uses of the term ‘cyberterrorism’ are far from 
consistent.
64
 Thus, although cyberterrorism is overwhelmingly presented as a serious, 
destructive and imminent threat,
65
 assessments of the risk this threat poses vary 
considerably.
66
  
 A particularly prominent use of the term cyberterrorism in media discourse is with 
reference to the manipulation of digital technologies by those associated with offline terrorist 
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groups such as al-Qaeda and the Tariq bin Ziyad Brigades. Occasionally such accounts hone 
in on newsworthy individuals such as Younis Tsouli. Tsouli – a UK resident, and active 
member on jihadi forums who also committed acts of cyber-crime to fund affiliated causes 
between 2003 and 2005 – was depicted as one of al-Qaeda’s ‘most influential cyber-
terrorists’.67 Other stories adopt a more generalized position, for example warning of how Al-
Qaida is plotting “cyber jihad” against Britain and the West, making use of ‘crack units to 
target key computer systems’. 68  While these understandings distinguish ‘cyberterrorism’ 
from the activities of states, other accounts collapse any such distinction.69 Mikhel Tammet, 
Chair of Estonia's Cyber-defence Co-ordination Committee, for example, argues in a piece 
published by Reuters that there is nothing oxymoronic in likening Russia’s alleged 2007 
attack on Estonia to ‘a kind of terrorism’:  
 
                                                          
67
 John Steele, “IT ‘anorak’ who spread al-Qa’eda hate,” The Telegraph, January 17 2008, accessed December 
15 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1575842/IT-anorak-who-spread-al-Qaeda-hate.html. 
68
 Newscore, “Al-Qaida lotting ‘cyber jihad”, 14 July 2011, accessed 28 June 2015, 
http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/al-qaida-plotting-cyber-jihad/story-fn6e1m7z-1226094225380.  
69
 Iran, China and North Korea are frequently associated with cyberterrorism in media coverage. See, 
respectively: Associated Press, “Iran’s foreign ministry says country ready for flexibility at nuclear talks,” Fox 
News, October 13 2012, accessed December 15 2014, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/10/13/iran-
supreme-leader-vows-to-defeat-sanctions-military-threats-and-oft-wars/; Dylan Welch, “Cyber soldiers,” The 
Sydney Morning Herald, October 9 2010, accessed December 15 2014, 
http://www.smh.com.au/technology/technology-news/cyber-soldiers-20101009-16c7e.html; Associated Press 
and Daily Mail Reporter, “North Korea ‘preparing to test another nuclear missile’ amid feats of a cyber attack 
on the U.S.,” Mail Online, April 8 2013, accessed December 15 2014, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
2305617/North-Korea-preparing-nuclear-missile-test-amid-fears-cyber-attack-U-S.html. 
20 
The act of terrorism is not to steal from a state, or even to conquer it. It is, as the word suggests, to sow 
terror itself. If a highly IT country cannot carry out its everyday activities, like banking, it sows terror 
among the people.
70
 
 
North Korea’s alleged 2011 hack of a South Korean bank was portrayed in similar terms. 
Two stories in our sample implied this constituted cyber-terrorism; three others made an 
explicit connection, with two of these quoting South Korean prosecutor Kim Young-dae’s 
description of the hack as an ‘unprecedented act of cyber terror’.71  
 Activist groups operating online – more widely referred to as ‘hacktivists’ – also, at 
times, attract this soubriquet. CNN reported that the most familiar of these groups, 
Anonymous, found themselves ‘dubbed cyberterrorists’. 72  Another collective AntiSec’s 
hacking of more than 70 U.S. law enforcement institutions saw this organisation similarly 
described as a ‘cyberterrorist collaboration’.73 Coverage of the 2012 hack of Israeli credit 
card details attributed to Saudi hacker OxOmar also made frequent use of the words of Israeli 
Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalo,
74
 who argued that this constituted, ‘a breach of 
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sovereignty comparable to a terrorist operation’.75 Meanwhile, attacks on businesses are also 
frequently framed as evidence of the risk of cyberterrorism
76
 with the widespread reporting of 
the following remarks by Sony’s former CEO, Sir Howard Stringer indicative here: 
 
I think you see that cyber terrorism is now a global force, affecting many more companies than just 
Sony…If hackers can hack Citibank, the FBI and the CIA, and yesterday the video game company 
Electronics Arts, then it's a negative situation that governments may have to resolve.
77
 
 
Other media reports, finally, ‘stretch’ this concept still further, with disparate activities 
including IRA propaganda videos
78
, the use of Twitter
79
 and hoax terrorist e-mails designated 
‘cyberterrorist’.80 
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Analogy, authority and threat construction 
Despite this flexibility in the use of the cyberterrorism lexicon, news media coverage is 
overwhelmingly concerned with the seriousness of this (ambiguous) threat.
81
 According to an 
article in The West Australian, for instance, ‘Islamists want to take the world back to the 
primitive social relations and religious ethos of the 7th century, [and] they are utilising 
the most advanced digital technology of the modern era in their cause’. 82  The 
Washington Post, likewise, cites the Assistant Attorney General for National Security 
John Carlin to inform readers that we are ‘very vulnerable’83 to a terrorist attack on 
critical infrastructure. Indeed, this is a vulnerability that for, ex-executive assistant 
director of the FBI Shawn Henry is second only to a ‘weapon of mass destruction going 
off in one of our major cities’.84  
Dissenting voices do, of course, emerge. Stephen Cummings, former director of 
the UK Government’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, for example, 
is cited in a 2008 Reuters story to suggest that cyberterrorism ‘distracts our attention 
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from the more pressing terrorist threats, which are still physical’. 85  Cummings 
concludes, ‘Cyberterrorism is a myth’.86 Other critics offer civil liberty concerns about 
the uses to which this (fabricated) threat is put. Head of the Australian Council of Civil 
Liberties Terry O’Gorman, for example, argues to ABC News that attempts to tighten 
national laws on the grounds of cyberterrorism risk, ‘losing the balance between giving 
the intelligence services sufficient powers to fight terrorism while at the same time 
keeping longstanding and cherished civil liberties’. 87  These voices of caution are, 
however, comparatively rare
88
 and frequently drowned out by reports of risk and 
vulnerability. US Senator Dianne Feinstein’s discussion of terrorists opening the floodgates 
of a dam, disrupting air traffic control, or shutting down the New York Stock Exchange is 
given coverage in a CNN piece titled ‘There’s nothing virtual about cyber attack’.89 A 2010 
article written by the Daily Mail’s Science Editor, Michael Hanlon, outlines a detailed yet 
entirely fictional example of cyberterrorism from the year 2017 that has catastrophic 
financial, energy, communication and social consequences far beyond its projected death toll 
                                                          
85
 Stephen Cummings quoted in Mark Trevelyan, “Security experts split on “cyberterrorism” threat.” 
86
 Stephen Cummings quoted in Mark Trevelyan, “Security experts split on “cyberterrorism” threat.” 
87
 Terry O’Gorman quoted in N.A, “Civil liberties expert slams email spying plans,” ABC News, April 14 2008, 
accessed December 15 2014, http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-04-14/civil-liberties-expert-slams-email-spying-
plans/2403100.  
88
 Of the news items studied which had cyberterrorism as their primary or secondary focus (n=400), just 12 
(3%) were categorised as either sceptical or sceptical with elements of concern, whilst 301 (75%) were classed 
as concerned or concerned with elements of scepticism. The remainder were classified as either balanced or 
neither. See: Jarvis, L., Macdonald, S. and Whiting, A, op. cit. pp. 60-75. 
89
 Dianne Feinstein quoted in Bob Greene, “There’s nothing virtual about cyber attack,” CNN, October 7 2012, 
accessed June 28 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/10/07/opinion/greene-cyber-real/. 
24 
of 2900. Hanlon dubs this ‘Britain’s Pearl Harbor’: an event that ‘brought one of the world’s 
most advanced nations almost to its knees’.90 
The above examples demonstrate the importance of two features of news media 
cyberterrorism discourse noted in this article’s introduction. The first of these is 
widespread citation of, or reference to, named figures such as intelligence professionals, 
political elites and industry representatives with some claim to authority in the area of 
cyber-security. A Washington Post article of 2010, for example, cites former FBI 
Director, Robert S. Mueller III, in a discussion of the ‘clear interest’ terrorists have shown in 
pursuing ‘hacking skills’, for inflicting further damage upon ‘our economy and our psyche’.91 
In the UK, former Minister for Security and Counter-terrorism Lord West of Spithead,
92
 and 
ex-MI5 Chief Jonathan Evans
93 
are similarly cited to reference the ability of terrorist groups 
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25 
to cause cyber-disruption. Former Home Secretary, David Blunkett, informs the BBC that 
‘jihadists’, ‘could be planning to attack national infrastructure - power grids, 
telecommunications and the like - via the internet, in order to hit a big and symbolic target: 
the 2012 London Olympics’.94 Finally, there are industry experts such as Eugene Kaspersky 
who asserts that there is a real imminent danger from cyberterrorism: ‘I don’t want to speak 
about it’ Kaspersky argues, before suggesting: ‘…we are close, very close, to cyber terrorism. 
Perhaps already the criminals have sold their skills to the terrorists – and then ... oh, God’.95 
Invocations of professionals such as the above within this coverage make use of two 
potentially separable claims to authority. The first, and most obvious, is via reference to the 
professional standing of the cited individual. So, the Washington Post, for instance, invokes 
‘Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta [who] said that digital attacks “could be as destructive as 
the terrorist attack on 9/11” and virtually paralyze the country’.96  A CNN study of the 
credibility of cyberterrorism-related scenarios within the James Bond film, Skyfall, similarly 
involved conversation with: ‘Morgan Wright, a decorated former law enforcement officer 
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who has done work relating to cyberterrorism for the United States Department of Justice, the 
Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense’.97 And, perhaps most 
strikingly, a short article written by Jim Dexter at CNN in 2010 sought to establish the “facts” 
on the cyber threat by gravitating towards a number of experts including the ex-National 
Intelligence Director Dennis Blair, ex-Senate Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein, the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Robert Knake of the Council on Foreign 
Relations and Professor Irving Lachow and Courtney Richardson of The National Defense 
University.
98
 Citations such as these make use of what Finlayson and Atkins, following 
Aristotle, term ‘witnesses’, understood as: ‘anyone (or anything) we bring into our speech to 
support our claims; anyone whose thoughts might bring insight and whom we think our 
audience will take seriously’.99 The persuasiveness of this use of quotation works by an ad 
hominem logic, in which the credentials of the ‘witness’ are appropriated in order to add 
credibility due to ‘the stature with which the source quoted is held (and thus on collective 
assumptions about what counts as a valid knowledge claim, and who can make one)’.100 
Thus, in the above examples, it is the implied venerability of political executives or law 
enforcement officers which encourages audiences to take their arguments seriously – and the 
lack of such credentials which diminishes the force of dissenting voices. 
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The second invocation of authority within this coverage is via processes of 
predication through which particular properties are attributed to quoted individuals that go 
beyond their institutional affiliations.
101
 ‘Expertise’ is a particularly common attribute here, 
as with the BBC story on a hacking of the IMF which spoke to, ‘Tom Kellerman, a security 
expert who has worked for the IMF’,102 or a story from the same source which ran the 
following caption beneath a photograph of an individual wearing the now infamous Guy 
Fawkes mask: ‘Anonymous may opt for amusing disguises, but they are a real danger, 
according to experts’.103  
Track records of previous accurate predictions are also cited. A Telegraph article, for 
instance, discusses a new book by former US National Coordinator for Security, 
Infrastructure Protection and Counter-terrorism Richard Clarke which ‘paints a doomsday 
scenario’ in which terrorists annex ‘the American computer system’, noting that, ‘Mr Clarke 
has been right before. As anti-terrorism tsar under Mr Clinton and then Mr Bush, he issued 
dire warnings of the need for better defences against al-Qaeda’.104  These invocations of 
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expertise provide an important supplement to the above references to institutional authority 
because of their role in affirming a ‘quality, attribute, or property of a person or thing’.105 
Predicates, as Doty points out, construct identities for particular subjects,
106
 in this case 
increasing the reliability of the quoted individuals. As argued in the article’s introduction, this 
is particularly significant given the lack of academic agreement around the meaning or threat 
of cyberterrorism.   
A second prominent feature of this discourse which may also be identified in a 
number of the examples above is the use of analogy to concretise the potential consequences 
of a ‘cyberterrorist’ attack. 107  At times, this involves generic comparison with physical 
weapons of war. ABC News, for instance, cites the British government’s warning that ‘a 
cyberattack on the nation’s vital computer networks could be as disastrous as a bombing’108. 
The Australian, similarly, reports that ‘a nation can be as easily crippled by the loss of its 
critical infrastructure as it can by any number of well-placed missiles’.109 Alongside such 
generic analogous reasoning, we also witness comparisons to specific historical events such 
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as the Mumbai attacks of 2008,
110
 or – more frequently – to 9/11, Pearl Harbor, the July 7th 
2005 London bombings, and even Hurricane Katrina.
111
  
Fears around an electronic- or cyber- Pearl Harbor go back to the early 1990s, 
although these have gained traction in recent years. Remarks by Leon Panetta on this 
possibility were widely reported in 2012,
112
 although comments by former U.S. National 
Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter-terrorism, Richard Clarke, 
also generated coverage, as in a Daily Telegraph article titled: ‘Cyber attack “could fell US 
within 15 minutes”’.113 Panetta has also been widely cited in media use of the 9/11 analogy, 
such as the Washington Post article warning that a digital attack ‘could be as destructive as 
the terrorist attack on 9/11’, virtually paralysing the country.114 As former NSA director 
Mike McConnell similarly argued – reported in 2012 – American unpreparedness is such that 
Internet-savvy terrorists could pull off an attack ‘in the manner of the raids of September 
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11’.115 In a Guardian report of 2009, it was 9/11’s unpredictability rather than destructiveness 
which was put to analogous effect: ‘just as the 9/11 attacks were an unprecedented attack 
with unconventional weapons, so too could a major cyber attack’.116 The same newspaper 
also later reported on US efforts to bolster resilience to cyberterrorism through legislation 
‘aimed at avoiding a cyber “Hurricane Katrina” situation in which a disaster is aggravated 
by a bungled government response’.117 Sami Saydjari – CEO of online security company 
Cyber Defence Agency – took this analogy further in an open letter to George W. Bush 
discussed in the BBC and the Guardian to suggest that the: ‘potential costs of a multi-critical 
infrastructure attack on the banking system, the power grid and so on in a sequence designed 
to do maximum damage approaches the trillions, and the damage would look like a thousand 
hurricane Katrinas’.118 
The use of analogy in media coverage of cyberterrorism is vital in the construction of 
this security threat. Images of the destructive potential inherent to generically-framed 
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‘missiles’ and ‘bombs’ underscore the seriousness of ill-understood technologies and actors 
for readers. References to specific historical events such as Pearl Harbor, 9/11 and Hurricane 
Katrina do likewise, while simultaneously reminding audiences that unexpected events do 
occur. These analogies highlight, modulate and even camouflage aspects of the ‘threats’ 
being discussed, not least because events such as 9/11 have been so heavily (re)mediated that 
their meaning appears, almost, taken-for-granted.
119
 As David Mutimer argues in his 
discussion of proliferation metaphors
120
: 
 
we must recognize that the metaphors with which a security problem is understood will shape the 
nature of the problem and its solutions, focusing on the aspects that are highlighted and marginalizing, 
or ignoring those that are downplayed or hidden in the metaphor’s entailments. 
 
Without diminishing the power of these rhetorical figures in shaping understanding of 
security threats, it is important to note that analogies such as those discussed above do not go 
uncontested within media discourse. A piece in the Straits Times, for instance, cites Dr Irving 
Lachow, Senior Associate at the Centre for Strategic & International Studies, who claims that 
cyberterrorists ‘do not have the technical skills that are up to the mark when it comes to 
executing a digital attack with an impact equivalent to 9/11’. As Lachow, therefore, 
concludes, cyberterrorism is ‘not a likely scenario’.121 In an article for Aljazeera, similarly, 
                                                          
119
 Jacques Derrida, “Autoimmunity: Real and Symbolic Suicides”, in G. Borradori (ed.) Philosophy in a Time 
of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, (London, University of Chicago Press: 
2003), pp. 85-136. 
120
 See also: Myriam Dunn-Cavelty, “From cyber-bombs to political fallout: Threat representation with an 
impact in the cyber-security discourse”, International Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2013), pp. 105-122. 
121
 Irving Lachow quoted in Grace Chng, “Cyber war: One strike, and you’re out”, Straits Times, July 18 2010. 
32 
Karen Greenberg discusses the ‘old alarm bell “cyber Pearl Harbor”’ in critiquing the 
‘chilling image’ raised by Panetta that ‘a cyber-attack perpetrated by nation states or violent 
extremist groups could be as destructive as the terrorist attack of 9/11’.122 Greenberg argues 
that such ‘early warnings of dire consequences’ sound ‘tediously familiar’, pointing out that 
in:  
the wake of the actual 9/11 attacks, governmental overreach became commonplace, based on fear-filled 
scenarios of future doom’ that should make us equally suspicious of ‘doomsday predictions and 
distrustful of claims that extraordinary measures are necessary to protect “national security”.123 
 
Conclusion 
Discourses – on security threats and anything else – are productive rather than 
representational: they create identities and threats while seeming only to refer to them.
124
 In 
this article, we have argued that existing academic literature on cyberterrorism has tended to 
neglect this insight, due to its organisation around three quite specific questions: definition, 
threat and response. These questions, we argued, contributed to a widespread (though not 
uncontested) meta-theoretical frame of reference and sense of scholarly purpose in which 
cyberterrorism is approached as a real-world problem to be solved. As an attempt to 
contribute to discursively-oriented explorations of the constitution of ‘cyberterrorism’ as 
cyberterrorism, we then introduced findings from our own research into the international 
news media. Our analysis, we argued, offered two contributions to scholarship. First, it 
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contributes to existing accounts of the media’s importance in the framing of this ‘threat’ by 
adding empirical depth to this scholarship. Although some important related work exists, 
discussed above, this is the first study of its size focused, solely, on the construction of 
cyberterrorism.  
The article’s second, analytical, contribution was to highlight the importance of 
authority and analogy in media efforts to securitise cyberterrorism.
125
 Authoritative voices, 
we argued, are called upon as ‘witnesses’126 both to validate and (less frequently) to contest 
threat scenarios in this context. This is, moreover, complemented by representations of 
‘expertise’ in the framing of those voices and their importance. Analogies, as explained 
above, are widely used to help make sense of the consequences and likelihood of potential 
attacks. Such analogies draw upon ‘real’ historical events as well as hypothetical 
constructions of future scenarios. Neither, of course, are neutral, for - as with all rhetorical 
figures - reference to 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, Pearl Harbor work both to augment and to de-
emphasise particular aspects of the events which are being discussed. 
None of this is intended to suggest that audiences of cyberterrorism news media 
discourse automatically internalise dominant understandings, assumptions or analogies such 
as those considered above. Readers of texts such as these engage in active processes of 
decoding in which the meaning of such texts is negotiated, and any news story may be read 
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more or less faithfully (hence the possibility of oppositional or aberrant readings).
127
 This, we 
suggest, implies the scope for future research building on this work which could include 
analysis of the ways in which audiences consume cyberterrorism discourse in different 
media. On top of this there is clearly potential for comparative analysis of – and of 
intertextualities between – political and media discourse on cyberterrorism. News sources in 
languages other than English would offer a further point of comparison, allowing enquiry 
into the productivity of different languages in the construction of cyberterrorism. As, indeed, 
would engagement with social media discourse and non-written sources such as multi-media 
coverage on television or online. Such work, we suggest, would build upon this article’s 
analysis of the role of analogy and authority within news media coverage of cyberterrorism, 
adding to our contribution of empirical depth to existing accounts of the importance of this 
site of discourse. 
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